117
abandoned as early as 1984. 257 State farm workers then vacated the farm blocks and moved
2to58Malawi or occupied land in government-controlled areas
Angonia District, which before 1986 included the territory of present-day Tsangano
District, is among the most fertile areas of the country and has exceptional agricultural
potential. Therefore, historically Angonia has been one of the most productive and prosperous
regions of Mozambique. Before the war local inhabitants were relatively wealthy, controlling
cattle and other resources. The best lands are along the Domue-Ulongue-M'Languene-
Tsangano axis (three sites in this area were investigated). The remaining land in Angonia is
less productive and is not in high demand (Wilson 1991b); most of it has limited accessibility,
thereby reducing its attractiveness to both smallholder and commercial farmers. Before the
war people in Angonia maintained that there was plenty of land available, even though the
two districts were densely populated. The peasant population, though, was reported2l5y9 highly
differentiated and factionalized, features that RENAMO exploited during the war.
Villages in the district were heavily attacked during the war by both RENAMO and
FRELIMO soldiers. 260 By 1985 a large number of people had fled in Malawi. Not only was
Malawi relatively close for most of the refugees—less than a two-day walk in many
cases—but many refugees also had extended family living there. The government did not gain
control of the area around Ulongue, Dome, and M'Languene until much later in the war. The
territory being m26ilitarily insecure, smallholders confessed that they felt safer on their farms
or in the bush. 1 However, the majority of the population in Angonia District fled the
countryside between 1987 and 1989. The U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR) estimates
that during the war about 220,000 people fled Angonia District, moving across the border to
refugee camps or staying in Malawi with relatives (Drumtra 1993; UNHCR 1993). USCR
257. Interview with administrator of Angonia, March 1993. See also Eliseu (1994).
258. Interviews with smallholders, Ulongue, March 1993; interviews with smallholders, M'languene,
February 1994; interview with administrator of Angonia, March 1993.
259. See Wilson (1991b); Bonga and Wilson (1993); and Ken Wilson, personal communication, February
1994.
Bonga and Wilson (1993) report that much of the killing and looting in northern Tete was committed by
local inhabitants, who were neither FRELIMO nor RENAMO adherents. They say that local people used the
war as a cover-up to resolve deep-seated ethnic, class, and other social struggles. At the same time, they
observed that RENAMO capitalized on these internal divisions, mobilizing poorer peasants to attack wealthier
peasants, commercial elite, and government officials. If these observations are correct, the end of the war may
not bring a calm period of productivity, but rather new struggles as victims attempt to recuperate lost property
or avenge perceived injustice.
260. Wilson and others report that FRELIMO soldiers frequently attacked the local population in Tete, those
who were thought to be RENAMO collaborators in government-controlled areas being particularly targeted.
Additionally, FRELIMO encouraged people to flee to Malawi since this would limit the number of individuals
that RENAMO could (usually forcibly) use for logistical support (Wilson 1992b; Bonga and Wilson 1993; and
Ken Wilson, personal communication, February 1994).
261. Interviews, smallholder farmers, Ulongue, March 1993.