52
village. But this process is very irregular, as discussed below. In only a few cases did
smallholders allow that they would present their cases to locality-level government officials.
(Upon closer examination it became apparent that locality-level government administrators
had strong connections with the local customary leaders in several of these instances.)
Smallholders frequently asserted that government officials in their locality did not know the
area or were not qualified to hear disputes; some stated that they did not have confidence in
these individuals. At the same time, in some areas smallholders interviewed could not identify
their local government officials or where they lived, but they could readily state the name of
their local customary leaders and where they resided. In a few cases involving nonlocal
commercial interests or joint-venture enterprises, smallholders maintained that they presented
complaints to locality officials.
In many locations investigated, land disputes have occurred between native and returning
smallholders. Farmers frequently declared that disputes were quickly resolved by customary
leaders. For example, if smallholders returned to their land and found other smallholders
using it, the customary authorities would determine who had rights to the land. If the persons
in residence were determined not to be the true rights-holders, they were allowed to stay for
harvesting their crops, after which time they might be given other land within the community.
But this smooth process is not happening in all locations and for all smallholders, particularly
for those who are trying to return to areas with high economic potential or population
concentration. Nor does the process of resolving disputes between smallholders and larger
commercial interests follow this pattern. In fact, in most reported cases such conflicts are
resolved in favor of commercial interests. 12 In areas where disputes are occurring between
commercial and smallholder producers, we have also witnessed an increase in disputes among
smallholders as they compete for resources.
The fact that smallholders apparently lose their disputes with commercial interests and the
state on a regular basis means that smallholders will probably be less inclined to resolve
disputes by the formal executive and judicial structures. This may foreshadow continued
hostility between smallholders and the state and between smallholders and commercial
interests. As we have seen, this hostility can have destructive consequences for Mozambique.
It is apparent—but not yet empirically proved by this research—that in many parts of the
country the suppression of customary authorities by FRELIMO has affected dispute-resolution
mechanisms and processes. In several locations, it seems that decisions regarding disputes that
were normally heard by chiefs (or regulos) are now handled by senior lineage heads or family
heads. Dispute resolution has apparently been compressed down to the lineage and family
levels in customary society. For example, smallholders in Chibuto District said that the "old
chiefs" and regulos no longer had power in the area. They initially stated that if there was
a dispute, they would travel to the locality (post) administrative area or to the seat of the
district to lodge the complaint. They argued that those with power in the area were the lideres
de comunidade. However, none of the farmers interviewed stated that they deferred to this
latter group regarding disputes. After further discussion one of the farmers referred to a local
"land problem." He was attempting to gain access to a neighbor's land to lay an irrigation
112. See Garvey (1994); and Weiss and Myers (1994).