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canal to his farm. The senior members of the two families were resolving the problem.
Historically this would have been resolved by the regulo or local chief. In this particular case,
it will be interesting to observe what types of "customary authority" evolve or emerge as
political and administrative power is decentralized in the postelection period.
Disputes among commercial interests, between commercial interests and the state, and
between smallholders and the state are almost always resolved by bureaucrats within the
government, not by the judiciary. For smallholders and commercial interests alike, this
creates a great deal of tenure insecurity. We have interviewed commercial farmers who
acquired property according to law (though in the process they may have displaced local
smallholders), but who were nevertheless unwilling to invest in that land. They feared that
the very authority that issued their rights would reclaim those rights and that they would then
lose their investment. This administrative, nonjudicial system permits unscrupulous officials
to make decisions based on factors other than justice, equity, or rule of law. This leads to
uncertainty and insecurity, which in turn lead to underinvestment, speculation, and poor
resource management.
In summary, we believe that the number of land disputes and conflicts will continue to
grow in Mozambique as long as there are discrepancies between the formal land-tenure
system (i.e., statutory law), actual land-tenure practice and rules (i.e., customary systems),
and administrative and judicial capacity. These conflicts will, in the long run, undermine the
peace process and democratic reform and lead to both political and economic instability.