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The new government's policies with regard to land—the creation of state farms,
cooperatives, and communal villages—and its emphasis on large-scale, state-managed
production at the expense of small-scale (private and family) producers led to new social
tensions, physical dislocation, and economic disruption in the countryside. 165 Fundamental
social relations and institutions were affected, including bride wealth, inheritance patterns,
and dispute-resolution mechanisms. At the same time, many aspiring entrepreneurs and petty
capitalists were prevented from realizing their goals. Smallholders and smaller commercial
interests (including the assimilados, whites, and Indians) had planned to move into the
vacuum left by white settlers. Smallholders and assimilados say that when they were
prevented from reacquiring holdings lost during the colonial period or from capitalizing on
opportunities created when the Portuguese and others abandoned the country, they became
frustrated and angry. 166 It is likely that this frustration made fertile ground for the expansion
of hostilities.
Field research, conducted in 1992 before the peace accord, documented a number of land
tenure practices, most of which were based on local social relations, war-time conditions, and
government policy. Tenure relations represented a patch-quilt of multiple types of temporary
(and occasionally illegal) and semipermanent land-tenure regimes. A broad mix of
smallholders, displaced families, commercial interests, and state enterprises existed
concurrently, and often conterminously, in Nhamatanda District. Although state farms had
recently closed due to financial and managerial difficulties, 167 they maintained control over
their land. Some smallholders were farming family land, while others were squatting on state
farm land or land belonging to former private enterprises. Some conflicts were reported in
1992.
As noted at the beginning of this section, the majority of the province's estimated
population of 1.42 million people—and uncounted displaced people from other provinces
—were squeezed into a narrow band, perhaps 3 to 5 kilometers wide, on either side of the
road and railway line (i.e., the corridor) or in protected government areas. Others were
forced to remain in RENAMO-held areas. Many of those living in the government-controlled
areas were living in or around government-created villages and cooperatives. These villages
and cooperatives had populations far exceeding their intended capacity. For example, one
village visited in Lamego had a population of approximately 5,800 individuals, though it was
intended to accommodate only 40 or 50 families. 168 Many of the current inhabitants were not
from the area, but came from farther south or north of the corridor seeking safety from
RENAMO attacks. Conversely, many people who claimed historical rights had fled the area
165. See Sidaway (1992); Geffray and Pederson (1988); Geffray (1990); Hanlon (1990).
166. Field interviews with smallholders, Chokwe, Gaza Province, April 1992 and November 1993; see also
Tanner, Myers, and Oad (1993). Field interviews with smallholders, Nhamatanda, Sofala Province, July 1992;
and Vanduzi, Manica Province, August 1993; Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993). See also Sidaway (1992);
Geffray (1990); and Hanlon (1990).
167. See Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993).
168. Interviews with smallholder farmer, Lamego, July 1992; this information was confirmed by agricultural
extension agents from Lamego, July 1992. See also Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993).