84
have been able to maintain rights to land between the private farms during the colonial era,
were pushed farther away from their land when the state enterprises were created. The
Lamego Agricultural State Farm in Nhamatanda is an example of such an amalgamation
(Myers, West, and Eliseu 1993).
At about the same time that the state farms were created, the government established
cooperative farms for smallholders near the agricultural enterprises and initiated its own
villagization program with the creation of the aldeias comunais (communal villages). Many
of these villages were established in the same location as the old colonial aldeamentos.
Neither Sofala nor Manica Province had as many communal villages as other areas in the
country such as Gaza or Cabo Delgado Province. Nonetheless, communal villages were
established in the former two provinces in the period from 1975 through 1978. Isaacman and
Araujo, 160 respectively, estimate that in 1982-1983 between 9.5 and 12.6 percent of the
population in Sofala Province was forced into communal villa1g61es. This contrasts with Manica
Province where estimates range from 22.4 to 25.4 percent. It is not coincidental that the
number of aldeias comunais established in each province parallels the number of aldeamentos.
To understand the dismay, frustration, and resentment that people initially had toward the
aldeias comunais, it is necessary to understand their attitudes toward the aldeamentos. Lundin
(1992, p. 28) writes about the latter: "The aldeamentos were a means of controlling the
population in a situation of social disorder. The aldeamento was an arbitrary attitude of
violence and was regarded as an imposition."
Regardless of which estimate for villagization we use, the total figure remains staggering.
Countrywide estimations of the number of people affected by the program range from 1.2
million to 1.8 million to 2.5 million. 162 If total population was 13 million in Mozambique in
1982, then between 9.2 percent and 19.2 percent of the country's population was moved into
communal villages.163 We know from field research in Nhamatanda and Vanduzi that all of
these people did not remain in the villages and in many cases maintained two home-
steads—one official in the village and one traditional on their family land. 164 At the same
time, many of the communal villages, particularly in the central part of the country, became
RENAMO targets during the war. Consequently, in many locations smallholders were in a
no-win situation: They were damned if the stayed in the villages and damned if they left.
160. Isaacman and Isaacman (1983, p. 155) draw their data from the National Commission of Communal
Villages, 31 May 1982; Araujo (1988).
161. In Tete the figures range from 10.1 to 17.3 percent, in Gaza from 30.1 to 50.9 percent, and in Cabo
Delgado from 86.7 to 90.0 percent.
162. Noticias (28 August 1982) reported that 1.2 million people were affected by the villagization program,
while Isaacman and Isaacman (1983, p. 155) suggest that 1.8 million people were moved into the villages. We
extrapolate from Araujo's (1988) work and figure that 2.5 million people were moved into communal villages.
163. Araujo (1988) estimates that by 1983, 20.0 percent of the rural population was relocated into
government villages.
164. See also Joao Carrilho, former chief, Ad Hoc Land Commission, Ministry of Agriculture, Maputo,
personal communication, July and August 1992.