barriers on manufactured products in exchange for the European Union agreeing to
reduce barriers on agricultural products.” (USDA 2006) Brazil and India have made
themselves part of the problem, this time, and so they have to be part of the solution.
Canada, it seems to me, is not a large problem for most WTO Members. It would follow
that Canada is not needed in the smallest groups. Canada does have to be kept closely
associated with the process, however, because as one of the largest traders Canada
will have to make a contribution to the outcome—negotiators need to feel that the pain
of farm trade reform is shared equally.
Can Canada without its old role in the Quad still influence the outcome on
agriculture? I accept the assessment of officials, who argue that “Canada is widely
respected as one of the most active and influential players in the negotiations. The
source of our strength has been our ability to bring practical, creative, and credible
ideas to the table to build bridges and to move issues forward. Looking ahead, our
ability to influence the negotiations will continue to be directly related to our ability to
generate constructive ideas, and to work on building consensus around ideas that
ultimately help to advance our own negotiating objectives.” (Canada 2005a) Officials
observe that many aspects of the Hong Kong text, notably the language on state trading
and the sections on a safe box for food aid, modalities for sensitive products, and tiers
for domestic support, began as Canadian ideas, and reflect Canadian objectives.
7.0 Conclusion: The Significance of the Process
Agriculture negotiations are different now. The EC and USA dominated the
Tokyo Round process, and the agriculture modality was bilateral bargaining. In the pre-
Uruguay Round period, the Cairns Group mobilized to ensure its members would have
a voice, a particular Australian concern after their minister was left out of the key
meetings during the 1982 GATT ministerial. During the early stages of the Uruguay
Round, the new domestic dimension of trade policy needed new ideas, which created
an opening for policy entrepreneurs. In the process of learning, frequent informal
dinners among the lead negotiators were invaluable, though most participants were
from OECD countries, except for Brazil. Now in the Doha round, groups have
proliferated, for at least three reasons.
First, the growing number of Members, each of whom has the institutional power
to block consensus, created the need for the leading Members to meet in small groups
to manage the process. Second, the WTO unlike the GATT is a “Single Undertaking”,
which means Members can accept the entire package, or nothing. Members have
gradually understood the implication, that all aspects of the system are connected: in
the Doha Round, Members are highly conscious of the interaction between negotiations
on goods, agriculture, services, and rules. In this inherently multilateral process it is
easier for small states to aggregate their material power in coalitions than to work alone.
Power and learning are not opposed concepts: the ability to make ideas effective
depends on power, but changing modalities mean different forms of power can be
salient. Third, the most significant change might be in the modalities for the
negotiations. Multilateral modalities such as formula approaches to tariff rate reductions
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