characterizes the work that takes place in multilateral encounters. Building group
consensus, through the dynamics of group process, is the key feature.”
When we look at other negotiating areas where the new dynamic is less evolved,
Ricardo Melendez Ortiz and his colleagues at the International Centre for Trade and
Sustainable Development (ICTSD) in Geneva suggest that many of the new groupings
cannot be thought of as negotiating groups at all. Such entities as the NAMA-11, or the
Friends of Ambition in NAMA clearly work together, but they do not meet at ministerial
level (yet), do not necessarily adopt common positions in the negotiations, and do not
even see themselves as a “group”, let alone as a “coalition”. More work is needed to
refine the typology of groupings, and to consider whether the relative informality of
fluidity of the groupings in NAMA or services as compared to agriculture makes a
difference to the negotiations.
6.0 Where is Canada?
Many observers have noticed Canada’s absence from the most prominent small
groups, such as the G-6. Why has this happened, and has Canada lost important
influence? It should first be stressed that while the eclipse of the original Quad is new,
Canada’s role has not changed since the end of the Uruguay Round when Australia, not
Canada, was engaged in the final bargaining on agriculture. Factors to consider in
understanding this reality include the country’s credibility, relative power, and
contribution to legitimation of the changed WTO process.
The lack of clarity in Canada’s agriculture position in its awkward balance
between export-oriented and supply managed sectors has affected the country’s place
in trade negotiations since early in the Uruguay Round. Nevertheless, over the past
couple of years, and probably until the end of this round, ministers and officials might be
just as happy to fly below the radar during a minority parliament, given the intense
scrutiny they face from Canadian farm organizations both at home and at international
meetings. Bizarre resolutions in the House of Commons that call for increased market
access abroad while offering none in Canada (Canada 2005b, 9960, 10017) do not help
Canadian credibility, but also do not further diminish Canada’s role.
Although not a member of the G-6, Canada is still a participant in the key
negotiation forum, the Green Room and the mini-ministerials. It is included in the FIPs
Plus and plays a leading role in informal meetings of senior officials. If material power
determined the relative hierarchy, this absence from the G-6 would be anomalous, as
discussed in section 3.1 above. But other forms of power are also salient, and might
provide more analytic leverage.
Canada may be absent from the smallest cross-coalition groups because they
must include the principal antagonists, if a consensus is to be found. It is noteworthy
that in an assessment of progress in the negotiations, American politicians observed
that “we're delighted by the fact that Brazil and the EU are both working together to try
to figure out a way to allow Brazil leading the G20 countries to agree to reducing
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