conserves negotiating energy, but makes it impossible for smaller countries to influence
the results. Not surprisingly, therefore, most developing countries did not sign the
minilateral “codes” that came out of the Tokyo Round. The Tokyo Round agricultural
negotiations were effectively bilateral, which might be one reason that aspect of the
Tokyo Round was a failure. In consequence of increasing substantive and geographic
scope, the Uruguay Round agriculture negotiations were formula-based: negotiations on
thousands of individual tariff lines with two or three dozen significant trading partners
was not feasible.
Many of the Uruguay Round agreements were explicitly designed as new
understandings of GATT rules, for example on subsidies. These aspects of trade
negotiations are inherently multilateral. Once a domestic policy is changed to meet
trade obligations, all trading partners can take advantage of the new rules, so bilateral
negotiations on rules issues are rarely successful. Negotiations on a multilateral tariff-
reduction formula, or on multilateral subsidy rules, create something on which any
Member can have influence because agreement is subject to consensus, unlike a
bilateral request and offer bargain. Blocking consensus alone is relatively easy, in
principle, but shaping an outcome requires allies. In the Uruguay Round, large numbers
of developing countries thought that they could safely ignore some new rules because
of the many Special and Differential treatment provisions in the agreements. They were
shocked by the difficulty of adapting to the new rules. In the Doha Round, they organize
to make sure that their interests are protected.
In sum, the negotiating process evolved to accommodate a changing
configuration of power, more complex issues, and new modalities. Power is still highly
salient for understanding the institutional design of multilateral trade negotiations, but
analysts need a subtle conception of its dimensions if we are to understand who has it,
how it changes, and how much critical mass is needed for any aspect of the negotiating
process. Most important, these changes are endogenous: the objective interests of the
actors have not changed nearly as much as their understanding of their interests, but
institutional changes affect how countries organize themselves to participate in
negotiations. An organization with 149 Members requires small groups. Their
overlapping interests means each Member will participate in multiple groups (including
different groups in other sectors of the round).
5.0 Coalitions and Learning: Lessons from Small Group Theory
The proliferation of small groups in the WTO is relatively new, but should not be
surprising. n any organization of 149 members, but especially in the WTO where the
negotiating agenda is very broad and members vary greatly in terms of the expertise
and material resources they devote to negotiations, plenary discussions are an
inefficient means of negotiation. Small group meetings, an example of the traditional
“expanding-and-contracting-concentric-circles” approach, are an attempt to find a
legitimate middle ground between negotiating efficiency and effectiveness. The Green
Room is a large group for a negotiation, but all key players plus all groups are
represented, ensuring that it is transparent, legitimate and effective. Members in the