Table 1: Small Groups Relevant to Agriculture
|
Regional groups (S/S) ACP African Group LDCs |
Cross-coalition G-4 FIPs G-6 FIPs Plus |
|
Offensive Coalitions |
Managerial for a |
|
C-4 |
Mini-ministerials |
|
G-11 |
Green Room |
|
Cairns Group (N/S) Defensive coalitions G-10 G-33 |
“senior officials” |
Are all these groups best described as “coalitions”? Odell and his colleagues in a
new book on developing countries in the WTO define a coalition as “a set of
governments that defend a common position in a negotiation by explicit coordination.
We do not include in this category ... a set of delegations that exchange information and
meet to seek compromises but do not defend a common position (Odell 2006).” This
framework sees coalitions as homogenous, which would seem to leave out cross-
coalition heterogeneous small groups. In small group theory, which is based on the
assumption that small groups naturally emerge in any social arrangement, groups of
individuals (and presumably of diplomatic representatives) can be homogenous or
heterogeneous. Similarity in skills, background and other attributes can facilitate the
work, but if the task requires exploring new ideas, then diversity is a virtue (Rubin and
Swap 1994: 135). Homogenous coalitions therefore have a role, but heterogenous or
cross-coalition groups may be essential for finding a consensus. Although a group
whose members are heterogenous is less likely to reach agreement than a more
homogenous group, if and when agreement is reached, it is more likely to be
persuasive.
The usual assumption is that coalitions defend an interest-based position, but
they could also offer opportunities for learning by their participants. Cross-coalition
groups might be especially important, since learning cannot occur unless the dominant
coalition changes to include those former antagonists who play a central role in the
problems that confront the membership (Haas 1990: 128). The G-6, it follows, is not a
coalition—the Members do not have a common interest in finding some basis for
compromise with other groups, but they are the principal antagonists. Rubin and Swap
conclude (1994, 147), with specific reference to the Uruguay Round, that “most of the
work in multilateral exchanges does not involve negotiation at all. [.] It is not the
staking out of positions, from which concessions are subsequently made, that best
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