Political Rents, Promotion Incentives, and Support for a Non-Democratic Regime

Tb                     Tm

∫f(Na)e^-rtdt≥∫R0e^-rtdt.

00

Integrating, taking logs, and rearranging term yields

The numerator of the fraction in (25) lies between 0 and 1. Under the assumption that the
activist services contribute significantly to the bosses’ capability to collect rents, f (N_a)>>1,
the bosses’ contract participation constraint approximates as:

1 - e ^ ^m ɔ
rTb J^,

which is a hyperbolic curve.

Expression (26) determines the lower boundary of a region in the (Tb, Na) plane,
where the contracts acceptable for the bosses are located. The point of tangency between the
participation constraint curve and a feasible supply curve is the boundary optimal contract. At
this point the bosses are indifferent between maintaining the contract and the change of
regime (Figure 3). Its location is determined by the productivity of activists captured by the
parameters of the function, f, and the bosses’ perception of the regime’s durability, Tm. In
particular, it follows from (26) that insecure geopolitical environment and/or internal
instability, by decreasing Tm, depress the participation constraint curve and expand the region
of acceptable contracts, adding flexibility to the regime. Conversely, a declining threat of
aggression or uprising causes the region determined by (26) to shrink, thus making it more

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