Political Rents, Promotion Incentives, and Support for a Non-Democratic Regime



Tables

Table 1a. Imputation of boss salaries; regression model.

Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

p-level

OBLAST

2.1024

0.3416

0.0005

INDEPENDENT_CITY

0.5523

0.0610

(0)

SALARY_NATIONAL

0.9226

0.0172

(0)

URBAN_DISTRICT

2.4715

0.3155

0.0001

ALL_CITIES

-0.4402

0.1466

0.0199

ALL_CITIES * AZERB AI

-0.2294

0.0784

0.0222

ALL_CITIES *BELARUS

-0.2633

0.1068

0.0433

ALL_CITIES *ESTONIA

0.3361

0.0753

0.0029

ALL_CITIES*GEORGIA

-0.3007

0.0797

0.0070

ALL_CITIES *LAT VIA

0.2558

0.0982

0.0352

ALL_CITIES *UZBEK

-0.5832

0.1269

0.0025

R2 = 0.9867

Table 1b. Imputation of number of bosses; regression model.

Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

p-level

RURAL_DISTRICT

8.0712

0.9059

(0)

BOSSES_NATIONAL

0.0081

0.0009

(0)

ALL_CITIES

-11.4004

4.7940

0.0414

ALL_CITIES* AZERB AI

21.4338

3.2951

0.0001

ALL_C ITIES *BELARUS

36.5713

4.2045

(0)

ALL_CITIES *ESTONIA

8.1200

2.5207

0.0105

ALL_CITIES* GEORGIA

20.9038

3.1715

0.0001

ALL_C ITIES *L AT VIA

14.5777

3.3752

0.0019

ALL_C ITIES *UZBEK

47.8951

3.7113

(0)

R2 = 0.9988

45



More intriguing information

1. The name is absent
2. Nurses' retention and hospital characteristics in New South Wales, CHERE Discussion Paper No 52
3. NVESTIGATING LEXICAL ACQUISITION PATTERNS: CONTEXT AND COGNITION
4. Food Prices and Overweight Patterns in Italy
5. The name is absent
6. The name is absent
7. Testing Panel Data Regression Models with Spatial Error Correlation
8. The name is absent
9. The name is absent
10. The name is absent