Political Rents, Promotion Incentives, and Support for a Non-Democratic Regime



Table 3b. Estimation results (with time period dummies).

(1)

(2)

(3)

Constant

0.1196**
(0.0532)

0.1274***
(0.0490)

0.1220**

(0.0587)

After 1961

- 0.1004***

(0.0361)

- 0.1257***
(0.0478)

- 0.0904**
(0.0404)

Number of bosses

0.6692***

(0.2212)

0.4328**

(0.1859)

0.6431***

(0.2479)

Average boss salary

0.8327*

(0.4260)

0.4386
(0.2704)

0.7239

(0.4670)

Retail sales

- 0.7922*

(0.4769)

- 0.3916

(0.3078)

- 0.8910*

(0.5267)

New housing

- 0.1447
(0.1066)

- 0.1016*

(0.0577)

- 0.1083
(0.1216)

Physicians per capita

- 1.1092**
(0.5191)

- 0.7823***

(0.2990)

- 0.9642*

(0.5586)

Students

- 0.3384

(0.3025)

- 0.3270**

(0.1595)

- 0.2858

(0.3304)

Investment

0.3442**

(0.1410)

0.2441***

(0.0639)

0.3352**
(0.1531)

Labor force

1.8242***
(0.6313)

1.3426***
(0.2988)

1.6451**

(0.6865)

Labor force,

0.2181

- 0.0448

0.0031

net effect

(0.7054)

(0.4198)

(0.7805)

R2

0.339

0.314

0.342

Notes:

1) Standard errors in parentheses.

2) Error term specifications: (1-2) - cross-sectional heteroskedasticity; (2) - cross-sectional correlation;

(3) - random effects..

3) Investment: ln(I/ Y).

4) Significance: * - 10%, ** - 5%, *** - 1%.

48



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