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allow for convergence of judgment in moral debate or whether they are of the parametric sort
which would block such a convergence. Of course, representations of both sorts may be at work,
in which case cognitive science can throw light on the extent to which weak pluralism is
plausible.
Conclusion
The point of this discussion has been to use recent advances in cognitive science to
evaluate some of the descriptive assumptions behind relativism, pluralism, and absolutism. The
argument for accepting Berlin’s distinction between relativism and pluralism, despite the fact that
what Berlin means by “pluralism” is what some philosophers mean by “relativism,” is that the
distinction is valid: There is a difference between finding someone else’s values comprehensible
as motives or reasons, even though one rejects them, as opposed to finding them
incomprehensible or comprehensible merely causally. It is the difference between recognizing a
possibility of reasoned discussion versus simply recognizing difference and then having to decide
whether to live with that difference or destroy it. The latter possibility, relativism, may exist
between different species or between mentally normal people versus psychopaths, but it does not
characterize what one normally thinks of as moral diversity. Neither Fiske’s view nor
Kropotkin’s allows for relativism. The upshot of the considerations raised here is that relativism
is probably false. The cognitive science of moral judgment does not appear to be advancing in a
relativist direction.
Furthermore, the tendency toward convergence in moral dialogue argues for some degree
of absolutism. What pluralism there is, is not strong but weak. Hence, Berlin’s emphatic plea for
pluralism is probably exaggerated. There is, however, some evidence that Berlin’s pluralism was
weak after all, that he did recognize some absolutes (Galipeau 1994: 65-8, 82). In that case, there