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is less disagreement between Berlin and the conclusion reached here, although one would still
wonder why Berlin stressed diversity so much.
The present conclusion about pluralism is very near to Brandt’s attitude toward what he
called “relativism,” which was actually just his term for pluralism: “Relativism as an emphasis is
misleading, because it draws attention away from the central identities, from widespread
agreements on the items we care most about” (quoted in Beauchamp, 1982: 38-9). That remark
seems to hold true of pluralism to the extent, if any, that it is true: There are irresolvable moral
conflicts, not only between cultures, not only between people, but even within the individual’s
breast. But to focus too much on these clashes is to overlook the extent to which absolutism is
true of the things we care about most.
Many of these conclusions are tentative, but I hope I have at least shown that advances in
cognitive science are relevant to deciding how far pluralism or absolutism is true. Parametric
structure, which plausibly underlies syntax, gives some idea of how pluralism might be true. The
cognitive mechanisms underlying mathematical intelligence give some idea of how far
absolutism is right. Advances in cognitive science should help us better understand the extent to
which we are inevitably divided and how far we are potentially harmonious in our values.
Notes
(1) None of the cognitive science appealed to in this paper could be called
“sociobiology.” The point of the paper is to sketch possible explanations of an aspect
of human knowledge, whereas sociobiology undertakes the task of trying to explain
behavior. Given that scientists cannot predict the flight path of a bee, the
sociobiological task is perhaps unrealistic. Furthermore, along with evolutionary