result in excessive psychological dependence on the captain as leader to
the extent that individual contributions to problem-solving are neither
voiced not attempted [Lack of Monitoring]. For example, one captain with
whom I flew made a particularly poor approach ... setting off numerous
alarms. In reviewing crew members' inactions afterward, the young
second officer (who literally said nothing during the final approach)
admitted that he had never seen an approach quite like that, but figured
"the captain must know what he's doing" [Lack of Monitoring] (Ginnett,
1993, pp. 88-89).
A first officer also comments on how difficult it was for him to convince the
captain that an error was being made:
I was the first officer on an airline flight into Chicago O'Hare. The captain
was flying .. On our approach, Approach Control told us to slow to 180
knots. I acknowledged and waited for the captain to slow down. He did
nothing, so I figured he didn't hear the clearance. So I repeated,
"Approach said slow to 180," and his reply was something to the effect of,
"I'll do what I want." I told him at least twice more and received the same
kind of answer [Hesitant Challenging] ... [Approach Control] then asked
us to turn east. I told them we would rather not because of the weather
and we were given present heading and to maintain 3000 ft. The captain
descended to 3000 ft. and kept going to 2500 ft. even though I told him
our altitude was 3000 ft. His comment was, "You just look out the damn