How Do Electoral Rules Shape Party
Structures, Government Coalitions, and
Economic Policies?
Torsten Persson
Gerard Roland
Guido Tabellini
CESifo Working Paper no. 1115
Category 1: Public Finance
January 2004
An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded
• from the SSRNwebsite: www.SSRN.com
• from the CESifo website: www.CESifo.de
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