10
improved our understanding of ‘attention’ (Johnston & Dark 1986) but it has
confirmed initial conclusions (e.g., Awh et al. 2006). More recently, neuroscientific
work both added a significant link to the anatomy of attention (Posner & Peterson
1990) and provided added details (e.g., Knudsen 2007; Nummenmaa & Calder 2008;
Reynolds & Heeyer 2009). It should be noted that despite its neuroscientific interest
and potential applications neuroscientific research has not, to date, contributed to the
elucidation of the nature of attention.
In conclusion and for the purpose of this article, I will assume that ‘attention’ is
proto-characterised by James’ features of “degree of reactive spontaneity” and
focalization, and subsequently shaped by the special evolutionary compatibility
(SEC) constraint. This implies the time dependence of Nm and therefore of attention.
In other words, the proposed definition is a definition of proto-Nm. In accordance
with the SEC constraint, the A taxon includes a very large variety of Nm and
corresponding attentions. Obviously, this variety cannot reflect the posterior
reflection of any single species (not even of the Homo sapiens!). Therefore, human
aspects of attention do not enter the definition of attention at the A level. As the
theory develops though and higher complexity levels of Nm are introduced, the space
of A narrows down (i.e., there is a smaller number of species possessing such
increasingly higher levels of neural complexity). In accordance to the TonE proposed
here, exclusively human meanings only appear when we reach external
representations (section 2.2). Still humans are an extant biological species and as such
their meanings have to share at least some of the earliest developments of nervous
systems. In the rest of this section after the next paragraph, we redefine the traditional
senses of human meaning and meaning-related notions in accordance with definition-
3. In summary, A-meanings are subject to the SEC constraint and a variety of factors
may apply to one or more species but not to others. This is particular true of certain
human factors like affect, motivation, and scientific curiosity.
On verifiability, as Mike Elstob noted (personal communication), given the
inadequate current resolution of fMRI scanning there seems to be a problem in
actually linking Nms to conditions like (a) and (b) above. Although, this is true there
appear to be at least two routes to a possible solution. One route may be via
exploitation of the bridge between neural formations and homeostasis that glia cells
provide.14 The second route is linking the reproduction or survival of extremely
simple animals like sponges to genes in their proto-post-synaptic scaffold. Such a link
would seem to provide further justification for the proposed definition through
advances in our understanding of the evolutionary transition from sponges who lack
neurons with clearly recognizable synapses to earliest nerve systems (Sakarya et al.
2007). To account for the traditional senses of meaning, I first need the following:
Definition-4: I will use the symbol Sc to stand for a stimulus within its context.15
Sc may be either perceptual or linguistic or a combination of the two. With respect to
a human H, an Sc may be novel (i.e., not previously encountered) or not. If novel, two
sub-cases can be distinguished: (i) for whatever reason, no meaning is assigned to Sc
(an N may be created though); and (ii) a meaning is assigned to Sc. The following two
definitions address the case of a novel Sc and previously encountered Sc in turn.
Definition-5: The meaning of a novel Sc, for the human H at time t, is whatever Nm is
created by the interaction of Sc and H at time t.