12
So, when relation (1) is not the case, what is the M(skepsis)? It is an l whose
meaning, even for the speaker or scriber, only approximates her skepsis. My
argument is appeal to private evidence. Nevertheless, empirical verification is, in
principle, possible by linking a computational system to a human’s brain.
Furthermore, in accordance with Boden’s (1992) distinction between historical and
psychological creativity, a historically novel l is more likely to be caused by (N, Nm,
H, t,), and a psychologically novel l by (Nm, H, t,). In summary, although we are
bound by language we can also extend it thanks to our evolutionary past and our
ability to create external representational systems (section 2.2).
The following four definitions and concluding remarks complete the outline of
our theory of thinking:
Definition-8: Let 1Nm be the first neural formation created by the specific triad (Sc1,
H, t1). Then the system of all jNm (j a natural number) of human H that have been
created by time t later than t1 I call it a concept of H up to t and I symbolize it by εNm.
For simplicity we may use the letter ε to refer to a concept but it has to be understood
that ε is identical with εNm. Naturally, a εNm is a very tiny subsystem of Nm.
Definition-9: σ is a thought of human H if and only if σ is a flexible and not
necessarily permanent structure of concepts and/or Nm (i.e., meaningful neural
formations, as per definition-3).
Definition-10: Belief =def A structure of neural formations and meaningful neural
formations on the basis of which one is prepared to act, argue, or live by.18
Definition-11: Thinking, T, is the interaction of meanings, or concepts, or thoughts,
or beliefs, or of any combinations of them.19
The meanings and meaning related structures identified by definitions 3, 5-10
correspond to different levels of neural complexity. Collectively, they constitute the
semantic structures, M, of an individual’s nervous systems. Hebb’s theory had a
similar structure up to third-level cell assemblies and had also allowed subassemblies
of 2-3 neurons. The theory proposed here hardly adds anything to that conception.
With respect to actual and potential structural neural complexity the two theories are
essentially indistinguishable. Nevertheless, Hebb’s theory does not include a theory
of meaning and that is a difference of fundamental significance with far reaching
consequences.20 Assuming my theory of meaning holds, the mind-body problem
collapses.
Concerning thinking the two theories take the same stance with respect to
thinking as a single series of neural formations. Their difference stems from
definition-11 that allows for both random and directional thinking. As such thinking
operates at any and across any of the complexity levels of an individual’s semantic
structures (M). When the complexity levels of M are coupled with the potential
number of neural states (of hyper-astronomical cardinality), we get the space of
neural thinking. Modern human concepts and beliefs constitute huge subspaces (in
terms of the number of N & Nm involved) of this neural space. Still, at the same time,
they are the constituents of our conscious attention.
The immensity of the neural space of thinking creates a problem for directed
thinking. To account for that, Hebb (1976) proposed that the exceptionally high