15
that “[w]hile human memory, both explicit and implicit, is likely to employ similar
basic mechanism as that of simpler animal systems, it is also doubtlessly unique in
other respects.” (ibid, pp. 2042-3). Nevertheless, no specific suggestions are made for
either. Meaning results properly incorporated in the memory field (that may well
necessitate the development of new memory terms and ideas) can help with both
endeavours. A potential basis for a sketchy modeling answer to the systems question
(not a proposal for specific neurophysiological mechanisms though) has been
suggested in Gelepithis (1989).
In summary and conclusion, meanings, concepts, skepseis, thoughts and beliefs
jointly constitute the semantic structures of an individual’s nervous systems. The
frequency, architectural modifications and even existence of these structures depend
on the individual, the species and their environment (physical, cultural or otherwise).
Applied to humans, this simple characteristic gives human ‘mind’ both its fleeting
appearance and protean structure. Nevertheless, recognition of the existence of
meaningful neural formations and even of the possibility of a full naturalist theory of
thinking does not imply a reductionist conception of the human mind. For, as in
evolutionary biology the gene is not the object of selection (e.g., Mayr 2004), so
meaningful neural formations, and therefore meanings, do not constitute in
themselves the criterion of the mental. They provide a necessary substratum. They are
not adequate. Several levels of additional organisational complexity are required as
the following sections demonstrate.
Challenges. The reader will have noticed that the key difference between
definitions 5 & 6 on the one hand and M(l) on the other lies with the source of
meaning. In the former cases the source is external (Sc), in the latter it is internal (N
and/or Nm). What is common in both cases though, is the complexity of the
mechanisms involved in the creation of the semantic structures of an individual. This
complexity is staggering. Its source is threefold: (i) neural; (ii) environmental; and
(iii) evolutionary. The rest of this section points out some of its elements. The focus
is on some of the distinct and related systems involved.
With respect to the notion of meaningful neural formations, the system of
mechanisms, Mm, responsible for the creation and modification of Nm is very
complex. This is due to the interaction between the host of basic memory
mechanisms involved and the additional mechanisms of novelty as they may be
glimpsed from the brief discussion concerning relation (2). Concerning meaning in its
traditional sense (definitions 5&6), at least two systems of creation mechanisms are
required. First, a system, Mp, that is responsible for creating Np. The literature on
LTM (long-term memory) should be able to provide some useful models. Second, a
system, Map, that is responsible for the appearance of the prevailed Np of Np . The
literature on recall should be useful in this case. Finally, the system of mechanisms,
Ms, responsible for the creation of expressions out of an individual’s skepseis should
be the most complex of all due to the fact that it is, normally, closely knit to both Mm
and the neural aspects of language. This is definitely not helped by the fact that we
are largely ignorant of the derivation mechanisms of l that vary from the routine to
the creative.23 It is worth noticing that current (e.g., Abbott 2006) neuroscientific
research on cognitive processing is both at its very beginning and possibly barking on
the wrong tree with respect to the level questions posed (e.g., switching of neural
circuits).
Focusing on humans, is there a system of core mechanisms for semantic
structures creation that is at work for all humans (barring pathological cases)? Such a