16
system would be an important human universal. The majority of linguistic approaches
postulate syntax or, more recently, the FLN (e.g., Hauser et al 2002) as playing a
significant role in human meaning construction. Syntactic considerations do play a
role in creating l , and therefore, M (l). Nevertheless, that is a far cry from explaining
meaning construction (cf. relation (2)). I think that this is a much more complicated
and wide-open issue that FLN may be willing to accept.
The theory of thinking developed so far is wide enough to be applicable to a
variety of animal species across the evolutionary bush but it is inadequate to capture
important aspects of the mind of a large number of animal species and to account for
the richness of human thought as manifested in the range of human activities we are
aware in everyday life and scientific pursuits. Its key inadequacies are lack of
sociality and of the ability to create external representational systems. The next
section proposes a theory of communication (the defining characteristic of the social
stage of at least animal evolution). Section 2.2 addresses the latter inadequacy.
2.1.2. Communication
Communication is basic to all members of a society. But, what is it really?
Despite its vast literature, the problem of the nature of communication is either
ignored or ‘communication’ is used, even within a single discipline, as an orienting
term rather than as an explanatory theoretical construct.24 With respect to the former
point, it is both interesting and revealing to note that two comprehensive reference
works, the MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences Wilson and Keil (1999) and A
Companion to Cognitive Science (Bechtel and Graham, 1998) do not include an entry
on communication itself. Instead, the former refers the reader to three related entries:
on animal communication (Hauser and Marler, 1999), on Grice (Bach, 1999) and on
language and communication (Duncan, 1999).25 The latter refers one to cognitive
linguistics (Tomasello, 1998). None of these entries considers the nature of
‘communication’. The same is essentially the case for any of the contributions in six
readers, spanning more than eight decades of research in communication (Cobley
1996; D’Ettorre & Hughes 2008; Haliday & Slater 1983; Pool et al. 1973; Smith
1966; Vaina and Hintikka 1984*1985). It is also true for at least indirectly related
work on the social nature of human and animal mind (e.g., Connor 2007; Mead
↑1934*1962; Moll and Tomasello 2007; Vygotsky ↑1934*1986).
With respect to the ad hoc, discipline-based treatment of communication one
may distinguish several perspectives. Act of sharing signs (e.g., Cherry 1978*1980,
Dimbleby & Burton 1998, Schramm, 1973).26 The mathematical theory of signal
transmission (Shannon and Weaver 1949). Communication as signalling beneficial to
sender (e.g., Slater 1983). “[T]he social mediation of information” (e.g., Hauser 1996;
Matessi et al 2008; Roberts 1973). Communication as a means to manage audiences
ranging from instructional communication (e.g., Mottet et al 2006) to political
communication (e.g., Stanyer 2007). Identification with interaction (e.g., Katz and
Danet 1973). Identification with its two commonsense meanings, (e.g., Arlington and
Baird’s 2005; Benowitz et al. 1984*1985; Murray (1998); Sass (1984*1985); Scott
(1996); Tomasello et al 2005).27 “[A]ny exchange of messages between human
beings” (e.g., Runcan 1985). Identification with context (e.g., Sperber & Wilson
(1995). Intention-based (e.g., Messer 1994). Intention to produce understanding (e.g.,
Searle 1999a*2000). The practice of producing meanings and their negotiations by
participants in a culture (e.g., Schirato and Yell 2000). Among humans, the process of
responding to each other’s symbolic behaviour (e.g., Adler and Rodman 2000).