2.1. The era of the exclusively natural mind
Unobjectionably, thinking and communication constitute significant aspects of
the human mind. Moreover, each phenomenon and associated notion encompasses a
cluster of related mental phenomena and notions. The common key structural element
of the two clusters is meaning. This section brings together into a theoretical system
the constituent elements of these two clusters by proposing:
(i) A naturalistic theory of meaning that for the first time delineates the class
of meaningful neural formations (section 2.1.1).
(ii) A hybrid theory of communication that bridges biology and sociology
(section 2.1.2).
The inseparability constraint is satisfied by systems of primitives (section 2.1.2.2)
that bind together all aspects of the individual as member of a society (with or
without a culture).
2.1.1. Thinking
There are three major approaches to the study of ‘thinking’: philosophical (the
oldest), computational (the currently dominant), and biological. Each has contributed
its own requirements for a theory of ‘thinking’. Philosophy rightly assumes,
implicitly or explicitly, that cracking the problem of meaning is the real issue that
needs to be accounted for. Consequently, all theories of thinking (and of concepts)
end up as one or another of a large number of theories of meaning (e.g., Davidson,
2001; Lurtz 2007; Millikan 1998; Newen & Bartels 2007; Peacocke 2001.
Computational approaches are split between those adopting the strong AI view
(thinking is computation) shared by a large number of investigators from Turing
(1950) through Newell and Simon (1976) to Dietrich (2007), and a more or less
computationally oriented view shaped by the need to incorporate the substantial
expansion of research into areas like implicit thinking (e.g., Litman & Reber 2005),
motivated thinking (e.g., Molden & Higgins 2005), emotional effects (e.g., Ashby et
al 1991; Thagard 2002*2006). The latter perspective is probably best exemplified by
Holyoak and Morrison’s (2005a) reader. In remarking on the difficulty of providing
scientific definitions of mental terms, they illustrate that difficulty with their own
preliminary definition of thinking:
“Thinking is the systematic transformation of mental representations of
knowledge to characterize actual or possible states of the world, often in
service of goals.” (Holyoak and Morrison 2005b, p. 2, their emphasis).
As they self-critically remark, their definition introduces “a plethora of terms with
meanings that beg to be unpacked, but which we can only hint.” (ibid). The implicit
requirement is for a theory of thinking within a wider context. Probably, the most
general proposal is mental models (Johnson-Laird 1993; 2005).
Biologically, the most elaborate treatment of the nature and basic mechanisms of
thought and mind as the activity of the brain is still by Hebb (1949, 1968, 1976,
1980a, 1980b). Subsequent work in this tradition either tried to expand on some of
his ideas (e.g., Changeux 1983*1985; Edelman 1987; Edelman & Mountcastle 1978;
Freeman 1975; 1999) or moved into the fascinating area of animal thinking (e.g.,
Bates et al. 2007; Kohler 1925; Norman et al. 2001; Shetlleworth 1998; Sulkowski &
Hauser 2001; Premack 1985; Taylor et al. 2007). In both cases no contribution to the
nature or basic mechanisms of thought was made. It should be noted that despite
Hebb’s legacy, his argued view (Hebb 1949, 1980) that the study of mind can be