section 2 I set out the central working hypothesis of the proposed approach and
introduce the key relations among the foundational notions of my theory. Section 2.1
presents the key features of the exclusively natural mind, and section 2.2 argues for
the key characteristics of the artificially natural mind. In evolutionary terms the latter
stage is only a fraction of the former. Accordingly, the bulk of the proposed theory is
in 2.1 where thinking, meaning, communication and understanding are addressed.
This cluster of ever evolving abilities and structures accounts for the continuity
between humans and non-human animals. Section 2.2 tackles the issue of
representation and argues that the ability to create external representations was the
necessary breakthrough for the eventual appearance of written human language and
the consequent dawn of the era of the artificially natural mind. The uniqueness of
modern Homo sapiens is due to this artificiality. Our uniqueness is of our own
species construction. Section 2.3 summarizes the key points.
2. The Evolving Nature of Mind
Within the scientific community, it is generally agreed that ‘mind’ is not
immaterial and that it is embodied and situated. In essence when one talks of ‘mind’
it is taken to mean ‘the mind of an individual’. Still, it is not in accordance with the
widely accepted perspective, in the biological community, of both species and of their
constitutive organisms as individuals. The following working hypothesis incorporates
this view:
‘The mind of individual E ’ ≡ ‘individual E of noémon species E’. 6
I make use of the adjective noémon (plural: noémona) in order to avoid misleading
connotations by the use of ‘mental’ or ‘cognitive’. It is derived from noûs, a Hellenic
language noun and it is used in this article in the technical sense introduced by the
following definition.
Definition-1: Noémon species E is a species whose individuals:
a) Possess one or more sensory systems.
b) Possess one or more motor systems.
c) Possess the ability of thinking.
d) Are able to communicate with other individuals of their own species.
e) Possess the ability of creating representations.
My reason for this radical departure from the received wisdom is simple. Within
a naturalistic Weltanschauung, ‘species’ is the essential prerequisite notion for both
biological and social sciences and a theory of mind requires the integration of both
perspectives. This requisite integration, coupled with the inadequacies of the
computational paradigm pointed out in section one, necessitates a re-description of
mind. Figure 1 depicts the key relations among the foundational notions of such a
theory. This nexus is fleshed out in the subsequent sections.