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3. Open Issues
Of the many remaining open issues the following seem to me among the most
important. First, there is the problem of the appropriate formulation of a ‘mental
phenomenon’. If the theory proposed here is accepted a good number of accepted
distinctions will cease to exist and a significant number of new problems will appear.
Among the latter probably the most important is the task of understanding more
thoroughly and deeply the extremely complex interactions between the social and
biological aspects of humans as well as the much more difficult tasks of the relations
among human communities and the emerging new era of the artificial. Among the
former, it seems that the mind-body problem will be the first that will have to be
abandoned with a domino-effect ramifications.
Second, there is the issue of the suitability of our current tools for developing a
theory of individuals as parts of noémona species. It seems to me that most current
mathematics is inadequate for such an endeavour. The precision of equations and
computational systems is at odds with the precise vagueness of the mammalian
nervous system. To describe the M and ΠH structures, as well as the systems of
fundamental processes and associated loops identified earlier, ‘the mathematics of
thinking and communication’ is required. This is a branch of knowledge humans have
not yet developed. It is always good to be kept in brain that even order is not a
prerequisite for phenomena like emotion. As James (1890, Vol.2, p. 146) factually
remarked: “Different feelings may coexist in us without assuming any particular
spatial order.” I would therefore urge that for the foreseeable future the methodology
outlined in the introduction is to be preferred to the usual mathematical tools
employed. Development of a fully-fledged language-based definitional system
compatible with as many field-wide empirical data and regularities as possible seems
the best way to proceed in the present state of the art. This may be one way towards
‘the mathematics of thinking and communication’. Assuming that such mathematics
is possible.
Third, there is a need to try to identify invariant laws for cognitive science.
Simon (1990) has elevated this objective to the status of the fundamental goal of
science and has suggested two laws of qualitative structure and four quantitative
findings as invariants. Newell (1990) strongly believes that the computer hierarchy is
an invariant law. Nevertheless, the issue is far from straightforward. Relations to
universals and classification are just two of these.47
Fourth, cognitive science needs a minimum vocabulary to serve as its descriptive
base. The one proposed in the previous section may be taken as a first step. An
appropriate V must be able to account for at least the following areas of an
augmented cognitive science: knowledge, consciousness, emotion, culture,
motivation, ethical values, and beauty. It appears that consciousness and knowledge
may be explainable in terms of the theory proposed here. To demonstrate such a
hunch and modify or not V is the major task I intend to address next.
Fifth, mental neuroscience needs to map observed types of NS complexity to
fundamental animal abilities and semantic structures (M). In speculative mode, I posit
several such types in Table 3. Empirical evidence may collapse/expand some of the
posited types. Their rough correspondence to fundamental animal abilities and loops
may help the design of neuroscientific experiments.
Finally, as a community, we should pay careful consideration in the emergence
of, and the consequences brought by, the era of the artificial. Definitely, it is not an
exclusively cognitive science issue; not even of an augmented cognitive science. It is