The name is absent

96

party in the province. In this case, even though I do not have information about voters'
perceptions of the former leader, the high rate of party reelection (see Cao 2000)
increases the probability that the incumbent party's candidate will win. Aside, I include
the percentage of population that the district of each candidate represents for the
province. As mentioned in Chapter 5, bigger municipalities have lower reelection rates
and therefore have increased the structures of opportunity for challengers. Thus, I
expect this covariate to positively affect the chances of winning in the municipal model.

In order to obtain the correct estimates, based on the structure of the data, I opt
to πm a conventional pooled Bemoulli-Iogistic model. Even though province-level
effects may play a role in shaping probabilities, not all the units are represented in the
sample. Thus, a multilevel model or including fixed effects model would affect not only
the degrees of freedom, but also capture just a part of the variance. Since I do not think
that time is playing any role here, no temporal controls are included, either.

Overall, what should the expectations be, regarding previous chapters' findings?
As mentioned, submission of province-level legislation is not affected by gubernatorial
ambition; on the contrary, one of the models shows a negative and substantive effect on
bill submission. Therefore, should a high number (or share) of targeted bills affect the
chances of victory? Following the same reasoning, the answer should be negative. In as
much, following the argument, positive effects should be found at the mayoral race
level. Five theoretical hypotheses have been formulated for the current analysis:

8.1: Increases in the number (share) of province-based legislation do not affect success in
a gubernatorial race

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