The name is absent

103

mayors do use legislation both as a defensive and as a prospective strategy; it seems that
it has not been a very successful decision, assuming that they expected increased
electoral support through these activities.

Discussion

The last sentence of the last paragraph restores a point already mentioned in the
considerations of gubernatorial candidates' poor electoral performance. To what extent
is it reasonable to suppose that bill drafting should affect general election results?
Winning a subnational executive position involves two necessary steps: first, to get the
candidacy; second, to win the race. Both processes are interdependent, but do not
necessarily involve the same activities and targets. Depending on what the candidate
selection mechanisms are, the median voter (or median principal) is likely to differ: in
closed primaries, party adherents will be the selectorate. In open primaries, decision is
more likely to be led by mobilized citizens, regardless of partisanship. For closed-caucus
decisions, senior party delegates might be the relevant actors. On the contrary, in
general races, the median voter of the whole constituency is likely to determine failure of
success of any candidate. The central question here is whether strategic legislative
activity is equally worth for both stages. Whom are legislators talking to at the moment
of writing bills? I repeatedly stated that voters and party leaders are targets of bill
drafting, as receivers of signals of a (pretended) powerful politician that deserves a
relevant place. Со-partisans perceiving that strength might opt not to run a primary
against that politician, or just put her in a secure spot of party lists. Voters perceiving
responsiveness might be thankful to her, promising further electoral support and
making it possible that the politician go to the media to show how popular she is. As a

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