IOl
Table 7.7: Municipal Models
|
Model 1 |
Model 2 | |
|
% of Municipal Bills |
-1.92 | |
|
(1.78) | ||
|
N of Municipal Bills |
-0.08* | |
|
(0.05) | ||
|
Previous Mayor |
-3.34*** |
-3.09*** |
|
(1.04) |
(0.99) | |
|
Distance to Median |
-1.04 |
-1.60 |
|
(1.82) |
(1-77) | |
|
Distance to Majority Median |
-0.18 |
0.37 |
|
(1.43) |
(1.37) | |
|
Committee Chair |
-1.53* |
-1.48* |
|
(0.79) |
(0.76) | |
|
PJ member |
-0.29 |
-0.07 |
|
(0.94) |
(0.94) | |
|
Provincial Party Member |
-0.17 |
-0.04 |
|
(1.24) |
(1.22) | |
|
District Magnitude |
-0.06** |
-0.06** |
|
(0.03) |
(0.03) | |
|
Outgoing Mayor's Party |
1.07 |
0.97 |
|
(0.88) |
(0.88) | |
|
Population Ratio |
-4.79* |
-4.58* |
|
(2.52) |
(2.43) | |
|
Constant |
2.37* |
1.99* |
|
(1∙25) |
(1.20) | |
|
Observations |
89 |
89 |
|
R2 |
0.20 |
0.21 |
Empirical evidence suggests that the direction stated in hypothesis 8.4 is
definitely wrong. Contrary to the belief that bigger districts might have better
opportunities structures and therefore improve legislators' prospective chances; better
results have been obtained in smaller-scale municipalities. As it becomes visible in
Figure 7.2, chances of winning range from 35% when districts are almost insignificant to
11% when municipalities comprise about half of the provincial population. Should this
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