anything. Also, other individuals may not aspire anything more than moving back to the
private market or simply enjoying a well-deserved retirement. So, patterns of ambition
are likely to differ not only across individuals and circιunstances, but also across time
and space.
Institutions affect behavior in a variety of ways. As most of the conventional
literature has demonstrated (see North 1990), variation in institutional constraints is
likely to exert different incentives over individual and collective action. Politicians
facing specific limits and permits might act different from what they would do if some
constraints were absent. Thus, particular rules and procedures can also shape ambition.
As an evident example, Mexican deputies will not further a consecutive re-appointment
in a party ballot after their current term, just because term limits do not permit them to
run for reelection. In contrast, American representatives pursue consecutive reelection,
often until retiring from politics. It is almost obvious that a set of dissimilar institutions,
procedures, resources and punishments shapes their current activity and their
prospective goals. However, the literature has usually overcome that variation and has
highlighted the specificity of the American case as a device with a heuristic value. The
"almost-axiomatic status" (Carey 1996) of the American causal mechanism linking
institutions, practices and ambition has tainted part of the comparative research. There
is life beyond the U.S., and there is also variation in terms of the existing institutional
frameworks worldwide. Thus, patterns of ambition can also vary.
So, how to analyze patterns of ambition across the U.S. boundaries? First, full
comprehension of the cases is a must-do. Second, the use of appropriate causal
mechanisms is also a necessary condition. While most of the theoretical advancements in
the topic have been performed for the American case, nothing forbids complete and