Congress are therefore explored over that basis, and I discuss a new empirical strategy. I
also evaluate issues of data and measurement here.
The fourth chapter describes the research strategy and the data gathering process
employed to test the theoretical hypotheses.
The fifth chapter analyzes the relationship between previous career backgrounds
and legislative production. The degree of submission of territorially-bounded legislation
is an Imderlying dimension in the empirical model of this chapter.
In the sixth chapter, I test whether immediate subnational executive ambitions
also shape bill-drafting. The intuition is that legislators who are seeking gubernatorial or
mayoral offices will be more prone to submit local legislation that help them during
future subnational campaigns.
In the seventh section, I evaluate whether proposing local-targeted bills affect the
chances of winning subnational offices. I test the effects of the number (and the
proportion) of local bills submitted on the electoral victory for gubernatorial or mayoral
positions.
I discuss the overall findings and conclude the thesis in the eighth chapter, where
I also point extensions and further lines of research out.