decision making process. As many theories from different perspectives demonstrated
(Shepsle and Weingast 1984, Krehbiel 1991, Cox 2006), the division of the labor in the
House gives committees a preponderant role. Committee members have gatekeeping
powers (Denzau and McKay 1983, Krehbiel 1987) over which policies will be sent to the
floor. Regardless of the debate between party-based or preference-based behavior by
committee members; it is clear that they play a key role in determining what policies are
implemented. For this reason, the literature has recognized how important committee
membership (and especially a chairmanship) is for politicians. Staying in the House
within an area of policy specialization is likely to be a substantive source of resources to
do politics (i.e. money, access to media, staff, or sponsorship of interest groups). This ⅛
makes a long-lasting tenure as a representative a goal itself.
In fact, theories that understand congressional institutions as endogenous to
legislators' preferences state that rules were designed to ensure die stability of its
members (Shepsle 1978, Shepsle and Weingast 1987, Weingast and Marshall 1988).
Scholars continually demonstrate empirical support for this goal. Congressmen do
pursue permanent reelection, and succeed 90% of the time (Fowler and McClure 1990).
The literature recognizes that incumbents are in a privileged position for running again
and again for the same seat. The concept "incumbency advantage" refers to a process
that feeds legislators' positive circle of success. Scholars have highlighted legislative
resources such as legislative staff, franking privileges and other material resources
(Fiorina 1989, Abramowitz 1991, Levitt and Wolfram 1997, Gelman and King 1990),
campaigning visibility (Fiorina 1977, Mann and Wolfinger 1980, Mayhew 1974, Zaller
1998) and deterrence for potential challengers (Cox and Katz 1996, 2002, Erikson 1971a,
Mann and Wolfinger 1980, Stone, Maisel and Maestas 2004) as predictors of incumbents'