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assertions, stating that the electoral connection was actually earlier (Carson and
Engstrom 2005) and that the incumbency advantage was also present in the 19⅛ century
(Carson, Engstrom and Roberts 2006, Carson and Roberts 2005). These contributions, far
from denying the previous claims for caution before watching the world through a
Mayhewian lens, help us highlight two convergent issues. First, different institutional
contexts and norms can lead to very dissimilar patterns of behavior. Second, even
though institutions and rules can differ, some processes might still be similar, but over
the bases of different causal mechanisms. It would be false to state that the adoption of
primaries and the Australian ballot did not make a difference in American
Congressional politics; however, the recognition of the existence of an early "electoral
connection" is not the same as stating that nothing has changed.
In sum, theories, concepts, and implications created for a particular setting can
have very different outcomes if they are applied to a different environment. In as much,
specific processes might be recognized in extremely different contexts, but they might be
product of very different causal mechanisms. This forces us to think about the accuracy
(and the particularities) of concepts such as electoral connection, political ambition, and
legislative performance in a broader set of cases.
AmbitionandLegislativeperformancebeyondtheUSHouse
It is not a new finding to state that not all of the world's legislatures operate under
the same set of premises. In particular, in contrast to the U.S. model, many countries
have institutional designs that do not foster the development of personal electoral
reputations (e.g., systems with closed party lists and proportional representation), where
candidates are not free from party constraints (national, regional, or local partisan