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control of candidacies) and reelection is not necessarily the main goal (different political
positions are considered more desirable). Given such differences, and their many
possible combinations, the expected political outcomes are likely to vary from the
Mayhewian model. In particular, legislative bodies where the reelection assumption can
be relaxed are likely to foster different kinds of legislative activity.
Given the particular patterns of political progress, it seems reasonable to assume
that legislators in parliamentary regimes try to get reelected (Strom 1997). Since
membership to the Parliament is a necessary condition to become a minister (a
recognized goal of most politicians in these regimes); it makes absolute sense that a
politician would try to reach and keep a seat. A good example is Cain, Ferejohn and
Fiorina's book (1981), where they show how parliament members do Constituency
service to improve their reelection chances. For presidential regimes, the empirical
evidence is manifold. For several studies of presidential cases other than the U.S.,
reelection can still be the main goal of politicians in federal legislative office. Navia
(2000) and Carey (2002), worked under that assumption in their studies of Chile. Crisp
and Desposato (2005) kept the same supposition in their analysis of the Colombian
Senate, a claim verified by Botero (2008) in his study of the House. Carey (1996) shows
that legislators in the pre-Chavez Venezuela had permanent reelection as their main
goal. In contrast, other scholars reveal that legislators tend to pursue different goals
along their careers. Taylor (1992) demonstrates that Costa Rican representatives expect
higher positions in the federal executive, and therefore remain accountable to the
perceived most successful presidential candidate of each of their parties. This behavior is
triggered by term limits, but it is rmclear whether it would be different, barriers absent.
Mainwaring (1999) denies that Brazilian legislators are pure reelection seekers; in a