The name is absent

Chapter 2: Ambition and Politics in Different Settings

Ambition and Legislative Performance in the US House

When David Mayhew published his seminal piece "Congress: The Electoral
Connection" in 1974, he may have expected a substantive influence in the field of
American Politics. However, he might not have even imagined how influential his work
would become, not only for explanations of the American Congress, but also for
legislative studies in a comparative perspective.

A presumably simple causal relationship between institutions, goals and
practices, and legislative behavior in a specific context (U.S. House) defined the
literature in the topic from then on. Specifically, Mayhew explains legislative behavior in
an institutional environment characterized by single-member districts, mandatory direct
primaries (with minimal party control over candidate access to the primary ballot) as
candidate selection mechanisms, and legislative careerism as the most common pattern.
Individual incumbents try to get reelected and increase their power in the electoral
arena, within their party and also within the legislature (Fenno 1978, Cox and
McCubbins 1993, 2005). This theoretical model became a foundation of most legislative
studies in different settings. However, the specificity of the American case is what made
the model fit so well. The ability of the causal relationship to "travel" is more subject to
doubts.

Part of the validity of the argument relies on an empirical proposition: The
House is a central component of policymaking in the American political system (Shepsle
1978, Weingast and Moran 1983, Weingast and Marshall 1988, Krehbiel 1991). Therefore,
staying in the legislature makes a representative a potentially powerful subject in the

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