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forget what the source of her original power was: her district. Therefore, it is entirely
rational that she tries to increase her presence (real or virtual) in her home territory.
Once politicians have won an executive spot in a subnational unit, but still
decide or have to move for any reason, they have strong incentives to act defensively.
What is the meaning of defense? It simply refers to the ability to maintain the political
capital created some time ago. It does not necessarily imply that the expectation must be
to go back to the old spot; rather, it is a source that improves the chances of any kind of
aspiration. Moving back might be one option, but not the only option. In any case, the
strategic use of legislation sounds like a rational decision, following my theoretical
perspective.
Consistent with the repeated affirmation that local politics affect almost every
political position in Argentina, it is reasonable to infer that most legislators should
deliver some kind of territorially targeted legislation during their mandates, regardless
of their past background and immediate ambition. When subnational ambition is taken
into consideration, the intuition is that legislators with a territorial background face
incentives to deliver even more policies than their colleagues. Following the theoretical
speculations, legislators that have been governors or mayors in previous periods should
be particularly interested in targeting their constituents during their congressional
tenure at time t.
Governor or Mayor: Does it make a Difference?
I have already pointed out that subnational executives usually manage more
resources for political careers than a legislative position in the federal arena. I also stated
that governorships are the second most relevant position on the scale of elected offices in