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home provinces; no defensive activity can be seen by former governors. On the contrary,
the statistical analysis suggests that, the likelihood of sending province-level bills
decreases in their cases. Such a negative finding makes a réévaluation of the intuitions
necessary. Does it mean that these previous winners of extremely relevant positions do
not care about future perspectives anymore? Have they reached, in fact, the upper
bounds of political ambition in Argentina, and nothing else deserves efforts? This would
be true if the results of term limited former governors were different. Then, it would be
easy to state that politicians who left their seats for non-normative reasons are just
anticipating retirement. However, people that left office due to term limits are not
necessarily political corpses. What would explain that they tend to write even less
targeted pieces than any other single legislator? A feasible answer can be found in the
literature of political communication (Popkin 1990, Zaller 1992). Specifically, former
governors are so well known by voters that they do not need additional cues to remain
at the top of provincial citizens' minds. If they expect a return to the head of the district,
the governorship, they need money for campaigning and material goods to deliver, but
not necessarily symbolic politics to their voters. If the expected revenue of bill drafting is
low, in spite of its low cost, representatives might not even spend their time at doing
this.
How and why should the expectation of former mayors differ? As stated,
multiple goals could be forged from congressional office after serving as a municipal
head. One of the options is to return to the district, and it does not necessarily imply a
step back in a political career. Aside, such a politician could choose to jump to the
provincial level, which implies a whole different challenge in terms of knowledge,
advertisement, diffusion of ideas and creation of a support base. In order to do so, an