67
mayors. Thus, it seems that committee chairmen either do not need to act defensively, or
they can use approved legislation as a capital to show.
Table 5.9: Gubernatorial Models
|
Clustered SE |
Random Intercept | |
|
Previous Governor |
-0.30*** (-0.10) |
-0.28 *** (0.06) |
|
Committee Chair |
-0.41*** (-0.06) |
-0.31 *** -0.02 |
|
Distance to Median |
-0.22*** (-0.08) |
-0.05 (0.04) |
|
Distance to Majority Median |
-0.04 (-0.10) |
-0.20 *** -0.03 |
|
PJ member |
0.14** (0.06) |
0.05 * -0.02 |
|
Provincial Party Member |
0.20** (-0.10) |
0.09* -0.040 |
|
District Magnitude |
-0.03*** (-0.01) |
0.02 *** |
|
Term Limited |
0.24 (0.17) |
0.09 (0.11) |
|
Constant |
-0.89*** (-0.07) |
-1.07 (0.11)____________ |
|
Observations Random Intercept |
101,533 |
101,534 0.27 |
|
Pseudo-R2 |
.03 |
0.07 |
Discussion
In this chapter, I analyzed the relationship between previous background and
legislative performance. I think that the main general finding is a fact that might become
fundamental for future lines of research on subnational politics in Argentina: how
different the strategies of former mayors and former governors in the House are. Wlule
previous mayors keep on feeding symbolically the voters of the municipalities of their