A Note on Costly Sequential Search and Oligopoly Pricing (new title: Truly Costly Sequential Search and Oligopolistic Pricing,)



Since F is a distribution function there must be some p for which F(p) = 0. Solving for p one
obtains the lower bound of the price distribution
p = (1 — μ)p/(μN + (1 — μ)).

The price distribution (3) represents optimal firm pricing. We now turn to discuss optimal
consumer behavior. Consider a buyer who has observed a given price
p. This consumer will
continue searching if the expected benefits from continued search exceed the search costs. We can
define the reservation price
ρ as the price that makes a consumer indifferent between searching once
more and accepting the price at hand; this price satisfies:

(ρ —p)f(p)dp = c.

(4)


p

No firm will charge a price above ρ since this will lead to continued search (Stahl, 1989). As a
result the upper bound
p = ρ. We now derive an expression for ρ. Integrating by parts in (4) gives

ρ — E [p] — c = 0.

(5)


(6)


To calculate E[p] we solve equation (3) for p, which gives

p=


________ρ________

1 + bN (1 — F ) N-1 ,
where b = μ/(1 — μ) > 0. We note now that E[p] = ρ — F(p)dp. By changing variables we can
write
E[p] = R01 pdy. Plugging p from equation (6) gives, after rewriting,

E[p]= P 0o 1 + bNyN-1                              (7)

Equation (7) can be plugged into equation (5) to solve for ρ:

P =-----r~~—√----,                                   (8)

R R-C1 dy                                          v

1 Jo 1+bNyN-1

We note that the reservation price ρ increases in c and in N, decreases in μ and is insensitive to v.

It must be the case that ρ ≤ v. In addition, non-shoppers must find it profitable to search once,
rather than not searching at all, i.e,

v — E[p] — c > 0                                       (9)



More intriguing information

1. The name is absent
2. Rural-Urban Economic Disparities among China’s Elderly
3. Experimental Evidence of Risk Aversion in Consumer Markets: The Case of Beef Tenderness
4. National curriculum assessment: how to make it better
5. Why unwinding preferences is not the same as liberalisation: the case of sugar
6. An Intertemporal Benchmark Model for Turkey’s Current Account
7. Government spending composition, technical change and wage inequality
8. Dementia Care Mapping and Patient-Centred Care in Australian residential homes: An economic evaluation of the CARE Study, CHERE Working Paper 2008/4
9. The Formation of Wenzhou Footwear Clusters: How Were the Entry Barriers Overcome?
10. Private tutoring at transition points in the English education system: its nature, extent and purpose
11. Endogenous Heterogeneity in Strategic Models: Symmetry-breaking via Strategic Substitutes and Nonconcavities
12. Income Mobility of Owners of Small Businesses when Boundaries between Occupations are Vague
13. AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION UNDER NAFTA: REPORTING ON THE REPORT CARD
14. Lending to Agribusinesses in Zambia
15. Geography, Health, and Demo-Economic Development
16. DURABLE CONSUMPTION AS A STATUS GOOD: A STUDY OF NEOCLASSICAL CASES
17. The name is absent
18. The name is absent
19. Fiscal Sustainability Across Government Tiers
20. Industrial Employment Growth in Spanish Regions - the Role Played by Size, Innovation, and Spatial Aspects