The name is absent



Table 2b

Party Structure, type of governments and electoral rules
OLS and instrumental variable estimates in 1960-98 cross section

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Dep.Var

party_frag

nparties

coalition

single

ngov

coalition

single

ngov

party_frag

2.62
(0.74)***

-2.63

(0.43)***

nparties

0.24

(0.06)***

maj

-0.09

-1.88

0.07

0.20

0.44

(0.05)*

(1.48)

(0.20)

(0.18)

(0.83)

semi

-0.01

-1.29

0.25

0.02

0.39

(0.06)

(1.81)

(0.19)

(0.20)

(0.74)

district

0.14

5.02

0.75

-0.43

2.22

(0.07)**

(1.79)***

(0.20)***

(0.23)*

(0.74)***

threshold

-0.01

-0.77

-0.01

-0.00

-0.16

(0.01)

(0.27)***

(0.04)

(0.03)

(0.13)

investiture

0.04

0.84

-0.10

0.35

(0.19)

(0.81)

(0.11)

(0.34)

constructive

0.71

0.42

0.78

0.77

(0.20)***

(0.51)

(0.12)***

(0.48)

Over-id

4.25(3)

2.76(3)

3.65(3)

Estimation

OLS

OLS

OLS

OLS

OLS

2SLS

2SLS

2SLS

Adjust. R-sq.

0.40

0.49

0.25

0.34

0.11

N. obs

38

38

36

36

36

36

36

36

Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Controls included in all OLS specification, cols (1)-(5): lpop, col_uka

Second-stage variables in 2SLS regressions, cols (6)-(8): lpop, col_uka, investiture, constructive

First-stage variables in the 2SLS specifications: maj, semi, district, threshold, and all second-stage variables

Over-id is Hansen’s J statistic for test of the over-identifying restriction implied by the electoral rule variables having no direct effect on the type of government;
critical values at 5% significance are 7.81 in all columns



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