Optimal Private and Public Harvesting under Spatial and Temporal Interdependence



26


-⅛E yields (1 - e~rT )sF(s, τ)e-rsds = TE - E, so that
0

—E = - Te ~rT (1 - e ~rT ) -1E - TE + E = Ed, where d = (1 + r - rT - rT ( erT -1)-1 ) =
dr


(1 + r)(e -1) -rTe

rT 1              '

er -1
numerator and the


To apply the L’Hopital’s rule for d, we differentiate its


denominator with respect to rT and get


(1 + r)erT -erT
d = -------—

erT


- rTe rT                             (1 + r) - 1

------- which gives that lim d =--------= r > 0 . Hence, we
rT0         1


have - (E +rE) = = E[1 +r -rT - rT(e rT -1)-1]< 0. Now the overall term


rT                        rT

B1 =-(1 -      )( pf (T ) + V ) - (1 + r - rT - -r- ) E < 0, so that T1H

er -1                               er -1


<0. Q.E.D.


Appendix 3. Proof of Lemma 2:


Note first that we can write


A.3.1. F(T,τ) -rE =


T

F(s,τ)e-rsds

0

F (T ,τ )

T

F(s,τ)e-rsds

r

(1-e-rT)


TT

If FT > () 0, then F(T,τ)e -rs ds > ()F(s,τ)e-rsds

00

FT"(1 -e-rT)>()F(s,τ)e-rsds T  f(Tτ)    >()    r-rT)

0                     F(s, τ)e-rsds       ( e )

0

Hence, F(T,τ)-rE > () 0 as FT(T,τ) > () 0. Q.E.D.

Appendix 4. Proof of the Theorem: the sign of TτH = the sign of FτT

Recall from the text that the cross-derivative of equation [9] can be written as



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