Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?



62


Figure 3: Rent grabbing and producer friendly institutions

Key: A resource bonanza shifts equilibrium from A to A" if there are strong institutions,
which means higher profits and more entrepreneurs. In case of weak institutions the
equilibrium shifts from A to A', so profits decline and number of rent seekers
increases.


Figure 4: Genuine saving and exhaustible resource share

Source: World Bank (2006, Figure 3.4)




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