Figure 1: Expected utility as a function of the size of the co-paymant

As p increases beyond p0, more and more persons choose not to be
treated. The person illustrated by Figure 1 chooses treatment provided the
co-payment does not exceed p1. For p > p1 expected utility is increasing in
p, cf. (7). In Figure 1, v is strictly concave for p ∈ (p0,p1). Generally, this
need not be the case. And even if V is strictly concave for p ∈ (p0,p1) with
a local maximum at p*, it is not obvious which of the three values V (y,£, 0),
V (y,£,p*) and V (y,£,c) is highest.
3 Co-payment and social welfare
The objective of the government is to maximize the sum of welfare for all
persons. However, for a government concerned about equity it is not reason-
able to assume that this sum is unweighted. If the government cares about
equity, it is reasonable to assume that persons with low expected utility have
a higher weight in the sum of welfare than persons with high expected util-
More intriguing information
1. Monetary Discretion, Pricing Complementarity and Dynamic Multiple Equilibria2. The name is absent
3. How to do things without words: Infants, utterance-activity and distributed cognition.
4. El Mercosur y la integración económica global
5. The name is absent
6. Constrained School Choice
7. Der Einfluß der Direktdemokratie auf die Sozialpolitik
8. THE INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK FOR U.S. TOBACCO
9. The name is absent
10. Staying on the Dole