An institutional analysis of sasi laut in Maluku, Indonesia



at the discretion of the village government and the villagers have neither knowledge of, nor
control over, the expenditures. However, because the village head is well respected, people
do not complain about the lack of transparency. Like most Mollucan villagers, Nolloth people
believe that their leaders will act for the common good. This belief is an incentive to cooperate.

Most fishers interviewed, however, thought that the people should benefit from sasi directly.
They argue that the revenues from
sasi ought to be shared among those who are excluded
from the fishery. Several respondents (Catharina Huliselan, Frederik Matatula, Augustina
Lohenapessy) indicated that under the current arrangement, “the rich benefit more than the
poor.” If the people do not feel they benefit, they will have less incentive to support
sasi.

In our survey of 30 fishers, the majority (53%) disagreed with the sale of resource harvest
rights to outsiders. Therefore, the move by the village head to sell the harvest rights to the
local KUD rather than to outsiders was politically wise. At the moment, the enforcement of
sasi regulations is strong and compliance high. However, if in the future, the people do not
support
sasi any longer because they perceive it to be too unfair, some will encroach on the
area as soon as the power of the
kewang declines.

Individual incentives to comply with sasi rules depend on well-being, income, fish catches
and agricultural yields, in relation to economic needs. These needs include food and housing,
school fees for children’s education and capital to invest in alternative, additional or improved
livelihood activities. In the case of fishing, fishers see the need for new boats, engines and
modern fishing gears. At moments when these needs are difficult to meet (start of school,
monetary crisis, etc.), the temptation to trespass the
sasi area will increase.

Sanctions

The sanctions and enforcement by the village head and kewang are an important incentive for
people to comply. The
kewang is impartial and vigorous in applying the rules, and, therefore,
respected. The
kewang’s authority and the fear of social or religious sanctions is amplified by
the involvement of the church in
sasi. “Even if the kewang is strong, the people are very clever
and escape. God, however, is everywhere, and the presence of the church helps the people to
obey the rules” (Otniel Patty,
pers. comm.).

Social pressure

In a small village like Nolloth, it is difficult to move unseen. The 40 kewang members live all around
the village, the government and church representatives keep an eye on their fellow villagers, and
besides, there is peer group pressure from within the church organizations. It is hard to commit an
offence without being spotted, and the social pressure to comply with the rules is likewise strong.

Conservation of scarce and valuable resources

Nolloth has valuable resources, i.e., top shells and sea cucumbers, for which there is a strong
market demand. These initially provided the incentive to institutionalize and then strengthen
marine
sasi as a means of collecting resource rents. The continuing success of sasi, in providing
sustainable harvests in the face of virtual extinction of these resources in other areas, is an
incentive to maintain the institution. The Nolloth villagers have already experienced the
dramatic decline in harvests that follows when
sasi is opened too often, as happened under
the former village head in the 1980s. This experience has helped them appreciate the
importance of careful management of the
sasi area.

Desa Nolloth, Saparua Island 113



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