An institutional analysis of sasi laut in Maluku, Indonesia



Acknowledgment of problems in the fishery

The acknowledgment of fisheries problems differs more between young and old people than
between males and females. Over-fishing is a problem particularly mentioned by older fishers.
Many younger fishers have limited knowledge of management issues and are not too concerned.
This is also the case with women who have a strong idea that sea resources cannot be depleted
because they are a “gift from God”. Therefore, although some people do think it is important to
protect the resource, the idea that marine resources are infinite is still strong, and young men,
especially, tend to think in terms of intensifying rather than managing the fishery.

Attitudes

Laziness and greed were often mentioned as a reason for people to non-comply. Most offenses
committed by young people involved theft of coconuts, simply because they were “greedy”.
Another reason for non-compliance is the current tendency towards individualism as the
result of modernization. Several times, it was mentioned that people need education on natural
resource management and must become aware of the fact that natural resources have to be
protected. This is believed to be one way of increasing compliance.

10.7 Patterns of Interaction

The history of sasi in Nolloth shows that the system is a common property regime of which
the access rights and the rights of withdrawal have changed. In the late 1960s when top shells
became a commercially interesting commodity, government officials realized that the
sasi
system offered an institutional and legal means to control the top shell harvest and its profits
(Zerner 1995). In Nolloth in 1968, Matatula, the village-level government head, issued a
proclamation declaring the existence of
sasi on top shells within community waters and
asserted control over
sasi on behalf of the local government (Matatula in Zerner 1995). From
a common pool resource where, at set times, the whole community could harvest, the rights
of extraction have become limited to a defined group within the community (divers appointed
by the village cooperative).

The benefits are divided amongst the appointed harvesters, the KUD and the village
government. It is stressed that the benefits are for the community as a whole in the form of
village development. The villagers benefit indirectly and some villagers benefit more than
others (e.g., KUD members). Also, common villagers no longer have the rights of extraction
or the rights of access. In theory, the resource is still managed as a common property, but now
that benefits flow to the village government, in practice, the property rights regime has changed
from communal to private property. The benefits are for the community, but it is the village
leader who makes the decisions on how to spend the revenues for village development.

This is an important issue in the functioning of sasi and compliance to the sasi rules. In Nolloth,
compliance to
sasi and other fisheries rules depends, for a large part, on the position of the
village leader. At first when the former village head controlled the benefits from
sasi, villagers
complained and compliance was said to decline. However, before
sasi could collapse, a new
village head took his seat in the village government. Based on his highly traditionally legitimate
position and a strong
kewang system, the sasi rules are currently complied with.

Compliance, however, must also be seen in the light of marine resource use in general. The
sasi area is only a small part of the total fishing area used by the fishers. Nolloth’s artisanal

114 An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia



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