and other valuable fishing devices. Artisanal fishers are largely excluded from transactions
and, therefore, do not play an active role in fisheries management. The common villagers and
women have also no say in the fishery.
12.4.4 Enforcement
During the Dutch colonial period (19th century), the enforcement of village regulations was
carried out by a 50-member kewang force. Offenders were taken to the community house (Baileo)
where they were tried by the village court. A common way of punishing people was to tie a
red cloth around their neck and waist and make them walk around the community house as
a form of public shaming. Offenders who did admit their crimes could also be fined while
those who did not confess risked death by vengeful ancestral spirits (Aipassa, pers. comm.).
In a later phase, the local village government was no longer allowed to carry out justice
independently from the colonial powers. The kewang was to bring offenders to the Dutch
“controleur” (government official) or “polis Belanda” who would punish them.
Later, when the Dutch colonial period ended, the cooperation between the kewang and the police
continued. Offenders were halted by the kewang, who brought them to the police office for prosecution.
Since the kewang has been abolished, it is the village officials who report to the police in Saparua.
The actual enforcement of formal and informal rules is still a critical issue. National fisheries law
should be enforced by the police. On the village level, however, the police personnel lack authority
and legitimacy because they are influenced by personal relationships. Therefore, although they are
the formal authority, the effectiveness of the police in enforcing both formal and informal rules is low.
An interesting example of strong local enforcement is the one applied on the auctioned area.
The access rights to this private property regime are strictly enforced by the temporary owner,
his appointees and with back-up from the village government. The limitation of access rights
is based on tradition. Because of this, but also because the owner protects his access rights
strictly and the sanctions are severe, compliance is high. This thus seems an effective way to
manage certain parts of the fishery, despite the lack of a legal enforcement agent.
12.4.5 Compliance
Abraham Pattijpelu, a fisherman from Tuhaha, explained that compliance to regulations is
based on traditional beliefs in powers of ancestral spirits and adat. If an offender is not caught
by the kewang or police, he may have “a lucky day”. This does not mean, however, that the
offender will go unpunished. The spirits of the ancestors or God can make the person sick.
Therefore, it may happen that somebody who breaks the rules gets ill. “The person then realizes
he has stolen and will go to the kepala adat (the village elder) to confess. Subsequently, the
kepala adat will perform a traditional ceremony and pray for him. After that the spirit will not
disturb him any longer and the person is released,” Pattijpelu added. Although today the
people’s belief in these spirits has diminished, they would not run the risk of neglecting these
forces, and, therefore, spiritual powers still play an important role with regard to compliance.
Despite the strength of these spiritual enforcement mechanisms, active enforcement is
important. When in Tuhaha the kewang resigned, encroachment of the sasi area became a
problem. Poverty was often used as an excuse for breaking rules. Bram Pattipeluhu, a retired
fisher, explained that the local government was not strict in enforcing rules because “when
people starve, they will go and catch fish.” Our performance study, however, indicated no
150 An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia