the local government in developing a management strategy to protect their interests in the
face of competition from large-scale operators.
For artisanal fishers, lack of education seriously limits their job prospects, making the fishery
even more crucial to their survival. Our results reveal that where fishers feel pressured to use
destructive gears or break rules because of economic need and a lack of alternatives, this
incentive is more powerful than the rather empty threat of being caught and punished.
Recognition of resource depletion and management options
We found that fishers clearly recognize that inshore and pelagic fisheries resources in Maluku
are in decline and their livelihoods are threatened. Few would encourage their children to
enter the fishery even though they themselves find it to be a fulfilling occupation. However,
the realization of declining resources cannot as yet be considered an incentive to cooperate in
management because fishers, in general, do not perceive that management options are available
to redress the situation. They still consider ocean resources to be unlimited, even though
local resources may be depleted. Their solution lies in increasing their fishing power (bigger
boats and motors). In this, they are supported by the Fisheries Agency, national development
initiatives, and various community development programs.
Trust
Rural Maluku fishers have a very low opinion of the police and little regard for local
government which does not have legitimacy conferred by association with adat. They also
feel cut off from higher levels of government and the Fisheries Agency. While these are
incentives to cooperate with sasi at the village level, they are disincentives to involvement
with any higher level of management institution.
Social structure
The social classes are clearly defined and separate in these Maluku villages. Fishers are usually
among the poorer class and outside of the sasi power structure. This class structure is a
disincentive for poorer fishers to participate in management. However, because non-
participation and obedience to authority is the cultural norm, fishers rarely perceive this to
be a problem. This may change as Indonesia works through the current political and economic
crisis, but change will not come quickly to these conservative sasi communities.
The individualism of fishers and the predominance of family-centered culture in Maluku are
strong disincentives to cooperation with outsiders within a resource management framework.
Because of their inferior position in areas of public policy and community decision-making, women
fail to participate in resource management, even though they are very active in the fishery.
Political support
Enlightened staff in regional government offices and in the Fisheries Agency have for years
recognized the benefits of local management rules. While not entrenched in formal law, sasi
is often allowed and encouraged to flourish because of the recognition that official means of
enforcement of fisheries law are not sufficient to control Maluku’s huge marine territory. Local
kewangs provide a service to government without cost, have intimate knowledge of the local
area and the character of the fishers being regulated, and live next to the resource being
guarded. This is therefore, from the government perspective, a highly efficient and cost-
Overall Discussion and Conclusions 269