effective arrangement. In addition, the fact that many regional officials were born in island
villages provides them with a sentimental attachment to adat tradition. However, problems
arise when there is a power struggle or turf dispute between the kewang and the police.
Centralization and Pancasila
The government-promoted national ethic of non-questioning obedience to central authority
is a powerful disincentive to village leaders who otherwise might institute reforms or introduce
new village-level management structures. When all actors down a hierarchical chain wait for
some higher authority to take responsibility for decisions, very little gets done outside of the
official, centrally programmed activities. A second disincentive arising from the centralized
national policy is the complete lack of approval for any non-governmental, grassroots fishers’
organization. In the post-Suharto era of reformation, this may change.
Political instability or dissatisfaction
Non-compliance to sasi and other fisheries rules may constitute a political protest. Political
turmoil at the village level is, therefore, a negative incentive.
18.4.4 Incentives related to the structure of the fishery and its markets
Infrastructure development
It was pointed out that improved transportation links to city markets in Nolloth and Seri
spurred an explosion in the number of fish traders as well as an increase in fishing efforts. In
Nolloth, this was in turn connected to local inshore resource depletion. The strong urge to
take advantage of any new market opportunities is a disincentive to participation in
management where compliance with regulations demands a reduction in fishing pressure.
Resource conflicts
One of the more commonly reported resource conflicts involved intrusion by outsiders into
sasi areas. Loyalty to the village territory is an incentive to report and deal with intrusions
from outside. In our study area, there have been instances of spontaneous vigilante groups
traveling to other villages to punish fishers seen stealing sasi products.
Competition in the larger fishery leads to conflicts between the artisanal sector and commercial
enterprises with seiners, FADs, lift nets and compressor divers using poisons. In the future,
conflict among sectors may well be a critical point in encouraging the artisanal fishers to
organize themselves and demand clear access and withdrawal rights on pelagic fishing
grounds. This is an issue that, unlike intrusion into sasi areas, directly affects family incomes.
Currently, national law theoretically restricts access of larger vessels to inshore waters. In
practice however, large boats do operate close to shore and there is no institution to which
artisanal fishers can successfully appeal for relief or compensation.
Profit sharing in the fishery
Where fishers work together such as in the small-scale net fishery, lift net fishery, purse seiners
and the pole and line boat crew, there are financial incentives built into the profit-sharing
mechanisms that encourage maximal exploitation. At the same time, there are no effective
catch limits or enforcement of mesh size restrictions. These systems of profit-sharing, which
270 An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia