the ethic underlying adat and sasi, and the example of management provided by functional
marine sasi, may well have positive psychological impacts on fishers. Through their familiarity
with sasi, fishers of all kinds are introduced to fundamental and important management
concepts packaged in a culturally acceptable way.
18.6 The Potential of Sasi as a Model for Local Management in a
Co-Management Structure
As fisheries were developed over the last four decades, most countries increased the role of
the national government in managing fisheries. National governments, however, typically
failed to develop an adequate substitute for, or complement to, traditional, local resource
management regimes. In many cases, what is needed now is a more dynamic partnership
using the capacities and interests of the local fishers and community, complemented by the
ability of the state to provide enabling legislation, enforcement, and other assistance (Pomeroy
and Williams 1994). This includes a renewed appreciation for locally-developed sea tenure
practices (Ruddle and Johannes 1985; Manghanas 1994). This approach to fisheries
management will require a shift away from a centralized, “top-down” form of management
to a new strategy in which the fisheries managers and the fishers jointly manage the fisheries.
This sharing of responsibilities and/or authority between the government and local resource
users to manage the fishery or resource (e.g., coral reef, mangrove shoreline habitat) is called
“co-management” (Pomeroy and Williams 1994).
18.6.1 Co-management in a centralized society
The organizational structure in Indonesia is centralized (Dauvergne 1997). Through the
government structures, village organizations are directed and controlled. Development
planning as well as development of fisheries law and policy, is largely controlled from the
center. Ordinances and decrees are passed through provincial, district and sub-district levels
to the villages. Communication from the villages back to higher political levels is difficult.
Development schemes focus on intensification of resource exploitation. If a village wanted
to consider sustainable development options, for instance, the possibilities for adapting a
national program could be limited. If we talk about co-management, we have to take these
structures into account.
Within the village, the situation is similar. The centralized structure discourages input from
the general population. In most cases, the people passively trust the village head to do what
is best. It is difficult in this context for a village government to develop resource management
and conservation programs tailored to local needs and aspirations. The village leader has a
relatively powerful role and management of the fisheries depends for a great deal on whether
he has the motivation and dedication to be proactive.
There is also strong segregation and poor communication between the rich and poor and
between men and women. There are no formal structures that allow ordinary people to
participate in political matters, but even if they were encouraged to, they are not used to
expressing an opinion. Issues of concern are discussed informally within families. If necessary,
people contact a village elder or official they trust to express their needs, but their chosen
representative may have little influence on village matters.
How can we achieve functional and stable cooperation within the village and between the
village and the various government levels? One obstacle is the lack of awareness at various
Overall Discussion and Conclusions 273