lompa fishery), fishers accept this as fair and do not complain about restrictions to their
individual rights of withdrawal. Control over resource management is perceived by fishers
to be tighter in sasi villages, and compliance to fisheries rules is greater. The communal
decision-making process is also stronger and more stable. The level of bureaucracy in the sasi
institution is minimal, making it potentially very efficient.
Although decisions affecting the marine village territory, for instance, gear type restrictions,
are said to be made “by the community”, the voices of fishers may or may not be heeded, and
women are excluded from decision-making. Sasi is, therefore, not equitable in this sense.
However, the hierarchical structure makes decision-making very efficient. The level of
democracy and representation of interest groups varies from village to village. Our research
reveals sasi to be fundamentally male-dominated and paternalistic, with the general populace
in most cases not questioning that all is being arranged for the greater public good and
according to traditional law and culture.
18.5.2 Social sustainability
Sasi has significant positive impacts on social sustainability. Sasi villages have higher levels of
interaction around community issues, a stronger tradition of collective action, and less conflict.
Fishers in villages practicing sasi enjoy the same standard of living as fishers in other villages. There
is no demonstrable economic benefit to them but neither do they suffer economically from sasi.
18.5.3 Biological sustainability
Sasi rules that restrict access and limit harvest times clearly have the potential to provide
ecological as well as social and economic benefits. It is clear in the case of top shells (Trochus),
that this specific species, currently on Indonesia’s endangered species list, could easily be
extinct in Maluku were it not for sasi. When several Trochus habitats were surveyed, the
shellfish were only found inside or close to the Nolloth sasi area where they are under local
protection. None were found in the suitable habitats in non-sasi villages, where, according to
local informants, there had been a commercially exploited resource in the past. Likewise, sea
cucumbers, also protected under sasi, had the same pattern of distribution.
Biological surveys in northern Saparua Island suggest that where the marine village territory
is rented out and therefore guarded, there may be some protection of coral reefs from blast
fishing. However, blast fishing is a problem even in villages where the kewang tries to enforce
the prohibition, as in Haruku and Ihamahu. Protection efforts are hampered by the kewang’s
lack of legal status, equipment and financial support.
The possible impact of sasi on the broader (pelagic) fisheries resource is not clear. In seeking
to document the impact of the sasi institution on fisheries, one significant problem is the
general lack of “fit” between the sasi institution and the modern fishery that is geared to
deep-water pelagic fish. The fishers’ perceptions of declining stocks pertain to the impact of
all forms of resource management as it exists in Maluku and not specifically to sasi. Fish
catches of artisanal and small-scale fishers are in decline throughout the study area, signaling
the failure of centralized fisheries management regulations, such as they are, to conserve
resources and fairly allocate resource withdrawal rights in Maluku.
It is unlikely that, through protecting small areas of coral reefs and sea grass beds, the sasi
institution provides even an incremental and indirect benefit to the larger fishery, unless these
inshore areas happen to be critical spawning or nursery habitats for pelagic fish. However,
272 An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia