benefits to male bread-winners. The usually generous provision of benefits is geared to-
wards ensuring the previous standard of living in cases of illness, old age and unemploy-
ment. The last two principles define the beneficiaries of welfare state arrangements as well
as the nature and generosity of benefits. As a rule of thumb, generous earnings-related bene-
fits tend to receive more (political) support from large parts of the population than targeted
and flat-rate benefits and reducing them may be much more difficult (Bonoli/Palier 2000b).1
It is to be noted that the first three characteristics are linked to the welfare regime type: en-
suring living standards, putting a prime on the family as ‘service provider’ and maintaining
differences of status according to occupation.
Fourthly, as Schludi (2001: 63) points out in his discussion of pension reforms, Conserva-
tive welfare states also tend to be corporatist in nature. They usually allow for a partial de-
centralization of state authority to quasi-public administrative bodies which are often con-
trolled by representatives of business and labour, i.e. the social partners. According to sev-
eral authors, this characteristic increases the number of key actors in welfare state politics,
giving them plenty of opportunities to delay or obstruct policy change contrary to their in-
terests (Swank 2001; Palier 2002; Siegel 2002). In turn, it diminishes the state’s capacity to
control social policy development, also by adding actors who legitimately participate in
debates about welfare state reform (Palier 2002). In addition, Myles and Pierson point out
that the role for trade unions in the administration of social policy transfers grants them a de
facto veto power against reforms (Myles/Pierson 2001; Palier 2002). Concerning the Ger-
man context, Leisering states that ‘intermediaries’ - organizations that stand between the
state and the individual beneficiary - are characteristic of the provision of welfare. In as far
as these organizations enjoy a privileged legal status as providers and coordinators of social
services; they form part of a state-regulated and corporatist structure of society. Potentially,
such intermediaries can produce a high level of flexibility, but the extent to which they form
a corporatistically regulated and solidified actor structure means that they also form a
source of paralysis. Corporatism and regulation appear to many as a main source of inflexi-
bility in the process of adapting to global challenges (Leisering 2000).
Among the Continental European welfare states, the post-war German welfare state can be
literally described as its prototype. During its ‘Golden Era’, that is, the post-war period up
to the mid-1970s, it exhibited fully the characteristics identified by Esping-Andersen.
Through the course of its historic development (Bleses/Seeleib-Kaiser 2004; Schmidt
2005), Germany became characterized by a wage-earner-centred social policy, which car-
ried certain implications in terms of requirements for employment relationships and benefit
recipients.
1 Flat-rate benefits are less likely to be supported by medium and high-income earners than earnings-
related benefits, as with rising incomes, flat-rate benefit will not contribute more to someone’s standard
of living. The political implication is that flat-rate (and low level) benefit structures might be related to a
lack of support from medium and high income earners. As wage inequality increases, such benefits are
supported mainly for ideological reasons rather than based on material interest and are more easily sub-
jected to criticism. Thus, it is easier to reduce flat-rate/means-tested benefits than contributory ones (Pal-
ier 2002).