Abstract
We specify an oligopoly game, where firms choose quantity in order to maximise
profits, that is strategically equivalent to a standard Tullock rent-seeking game.
We then show that the Tullock game may be interpreted as an oligopsonistic
market for influence.Alternative specifications of the strategic variable give rise
to a range of Nash equilibria with varying levels of rent dissipation.
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