DIW Berlin Wochenbericht Nr. 50/2007
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Claudia Keser and Claude Montmarquette
Voluntary Teaming and Effort
In a series of experimental games, each of two players may choose between remuneration
based on either private or team effort. Although at least one of the players has the subgame
perfect equilibrium strategy to choose remuneration based on private effort, we frequently
observe team remuneration chosen by both players. Team remuneration allows for high pay-
off for each player for cooperation, but at the same time provides individual incentives to
take a free ride on the other player’s effort. Due to significant cooperation we observe that
in team remuneration participants make higher profits than in private remuneration. We
also observe that, when participants are not given the option of private remuneration, they
cooperate significantly less.
Discussion Paper No. 745
November 2007
Christian Dreger and Eric Girardin
Does the Nominal Exchange Rate Regime Affect the
Long Run Properties of Real Exchange Rates?
This paper examines whether the behaviour of the real exchange rate is associated with
a particular regime for the nominal exchange rate, like fixed and flexible exchange rate
arrangements. The analysis is based on 16 annual real exchange rates and covers a long
time span, 1870-2006. Four subperiods are distinguished and linked to exchange rate re-
gimes: the Gold Standard, the interwar float, the Bretton Woods system and the managed
float thereafter. Panel integration techniques are applied to increase the power of the tests.
Cross section correlation is embedded via common factor structures. The evidence shows
that real exchange rates properties are affected by the exchange rate regime, although the
impact is not very strong. A unit root is rejected in both fixed and flexible exchange rate
systems. Regarding fixed-rate systems, mean reversion of real exchange rates is more visible
for the Gold Standard. The half lives of shocks have increased after WWII, probably due to
a higher stickiness of prices and a lower weight of international trade in the determination
of exchange rates. Both for the periods before and after WWII, half lives are lower in flexible
regimes. This suggests that the nominal exchange rate plays some role in the adjustment
process towards PPP.
Discussion Paper No. 746
November 2007
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